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Albany’s Dysfunction Denies
Due Process
Eric Lane* and Laura Seago**
I.

Introduction

The coup that shut down the New York State Senate for
over a month last summer brought the State Legislature’s
dysfunction to the forefront of public consciousness. As the
public waited for the approval of several critical budget bills
and action on a long list of substantive legislation, two
members of the newly elected Democratic majority deserted to
the Republican side and then switched back again to caucus
with the Democrats, destabilizing the already listing New York
ship of state and spreading disgust among their colleagues and
the public at large.1 These events were, unfortunately, not
anomalous. The process by which laws are made in Albany has
been in shambles for decades. Newspapers throughout the
state have long reported on and editorialized against this
* Eric Lane is the Eric J. Schmertz Distinguished Professor of Public
Law and Public Service, Hofstra University School of Law, and Senior Fellow
at the Brennan Center for Justice at N.Y.U. School of Law.
** Laura Seago is a Research Associate in the Democracy Program at
the Brennan Center for Justice at N.Y.U. School of Law. The authors would
like to thank Lawrence Norden, Senior Counsel in the Democracy Program at
the Brennan Center for Justice, for his invaluable substantive and editorial
insight at every step of the process of writing this Article. We are also
indebted to Amanda Rolat, Legal Fellow in the Democracy Program at the
Brennan Center for Justice, whose tremendous preliminary research helped
shape our legal analysis; and Tracie Knapp, student at Hofstra University
School of Law, for her assistance in getting this Article to the finish line.
1. See generally Posting of Casey Seiler to Capitol Confidential, Krueger
Serves
up
Double
Dose
of
Frustration
in
Letter,
http://blog.timesunion.com/capitol/archives/15683/liz-krueger-serves-updouble-dose-of-frustration-in-letter/ (June 17, 2009, 12:25 EST). See also
Andrew J. Hawkins, Fallout Boy, THE CAPITOL, Sept. 29. 2009, at 1; SIENA
RESEARCH INST., NY VOTERS ANGRY AT SENATE, VOW TO REMEMBER IN 2010
(2009),
available
at
http://www.siena.edu/uploadedFiles/Home/Parents_and_Community/Commu
nity_Page/SRI/SNY_Poll/09%20July%20SNY%20Poll%20Release%20-%20FINAL.pdf.
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dysfunction.2 Over the last six years, this view has been
empirically undergirded by the work of the Brennan Center for
Justice at New York University School of Law, which has, since
2004, issued three major reports covering a decade of
legislative voting records, debate transcripts, and documents
that form the basis for legislative history.3
The first report, which assessed legislative records
produced from 1997 to 2001, compared the Senate and
Assembly’s legislative rules and standard practices to those of
all ninety-seven legislative chambers in other states and
concluded that New York’s was, by far, the most dysfunctional
legislature in the nation.4 In the intervening years, New York
has shown little improvement in the stranglehold of chamber
leadership over the legislative process and the four resulting
problems of unused committees, inadequate review of
legislation, insufficient deliberation, and a lack of public access

2. See, e.g., Editorial, Bring Democracy to State Legislature, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS,
Aug.
8,
2004,
available
at
http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/opinions/2004/08/08/2004-0808_bring_democracy_to_state_leg.html; Editorial, Albany's Failures, PRESS &
SUN-BULLETIN (Binghamton), July 20, 2004, at A4; Editorial, New York’s Fake
Legislature, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2004, at C13; Editorial, A Legislature in Denial,
TIMES UNION (Albany), July 25, 2004, at B4; Editorial, New York’s Shame,
BUFFALO NEWS, August 1, 2004, at H4; Editorial, The Trouble with Albany,
NEWSDAY (New York), July 22, 2004, at A36; Editorial, To Fix a Broken System,
POST-STANDARD (Syracuse), July 25, 2004, at C2; Jay Gallagher, Editorial,
State in a League of its Own for Dysfunctional Legislature, POUGHKEEPSIE J., July 25,
2004, at 7A; Editorial, Albany Emperors, PRESS & SUN-BULLETIN (Binghamton),
July 25, 2004, at 14A; Editorial, Still Broken After All These Years, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2009, at A24.
3. See JEREMY M. CREELAN & LAURA M. MOULTON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE AT N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, THE NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS: AN EVALUATION AND BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM (2004), available at
http://brennan.3cdn.net/1f4d5e4fa546eaa9cd_fxm6iyde5.pdf [hereinafter 2004
REPORT]; LAWRENCE NORDEN, DAVID E. POZEN & BETHANY L. FOSTER, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUSTICE AT N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: NEW
YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE REFORM 2006 UPDATE (2006), available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/d/download_file_37893.pdf [hereinafter
2006 REPORT]; ANDREW STENGEL, LAWRENCE NORDEN & LAURA SEAGO,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE AT N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, STILL BROKEN: NEW
YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE REFORM 2008 UPDATE (2009), available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/publications/Still.Broken.pdf
[hereinafter 2008 REPORT]. At the crux of all three of these reports is the
problem of dominant leadership that stifles public and rank-and-file
legislator participation in the lawmaking process.
4. 2004 REPORT, supra note 3.
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to the legislative process.5 On at least some measures of
legislative legitimacy, matters have gotten worse.6
Ironically, the Senate coup—by most accounts a cynical
power grab by Senators eager for attention and a distraction
from their legal troubles—did bear some fruit. Drawing on the
work of a bipartisan rules reform committee formed by the
Senate Majority in January, the Senate changed its operating
rules in July to impose term limits on chamber leadership,
create procedures for members to force bills to the floor, and
provide for greater public access to legislative records.7 Except
for a new rule mandating increased transparency, the effect of
which is as-yet unknown, these changes may have little impact
on the due process claims made in this Article. And while
other more meaningful changes are being considered in the
Senate, the chamber’s practices, as of this writing, bear little
resemblance to functional lawmaking. Similarly, the Assembly
has not made any meaningful attempt to reform itself beyond a
few minor rules changes enacted in the wake of the Brennan
Center’s 2004 report.
While these changes included
eliminating empty-seat voting in the full chamber, requiring
open and regular meetings of the Rules Committee, and
mandating oversight hearings, other elements of the
dysfunctional legislative process—like the absence of
requirements for committee reports or mark-ups and the
Speaker’s control over which bills move to the floor–remained
in place.8
In short, the lawmaking practices of the New York State
Legislature presently and historically violate what law
professor and former-Chief Judge of the Oregon State Supreme
Court Hans Linde calls ―legislative due process‖—the
constitutional obligation of the legislature to enact laws
through a legitimate legislative process.9 Linde draws this
5. 2006 REPORT, supra note 3; 2008 REPORT, supra note 3.
6. For example, the 2008 budget process was one of the most secretive in
decades, turning back the clock on recent moves toward transparency. See
Danny Hakim, Albany’s Big 3 is Cut to One as Silver Flexes Might, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 30, 2009, at A1.
7. See, e.g., G.O.P. Regains Control of New York State Senate, N.Y.
TIMES, June 9, 2009, at A1. (discussing new term limits on leadership).
8. 2006 REPORT, supra note 3, at 3.
9. See generally Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L.
REV. 197 (1976).
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doctrine from the due process clause of the Federal
Constitution—which is reiterated, almost verbatim, in the New
York State Constitution—under which he argues that
government may not regulate the conduct of its citizens or tax
or spend their monies without what he calls ―a legitimate lawmaking process.‖10 Behind this doctrinal claim is a clear
recognition of an often forgotten but foundational principle of
the state and Federal Constitutions—process is as important
as product.11 The intent of both the United States and New
York Constitutions is to simultaneously protect the broad
representation of multiple interests while assuring that no
single interest can easily get its way.12 The goal, as Justice
Louis Brandeis wrote, is ―not to promote efficiency, but to
preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.‖13
As Linde does not explicitly define governmental
legitimacy beyond stating that it is derived from constitutional
principles, one aim of this Article is to elucidate this definition.
We explore the lawmaking process in New York State with an
eye to its legitimacy, using the United States and New York
State Constitutions, and perhaps more importantly, the values
that have informed them throughout national and state
history, as our standards of measurement.14 Our focus is
systemic, not on individual pieces of legislation. We do not
argue that the validity of every law depends upon some set
procedure, but rather that the shortfalls of New York’s
lawmaking processes delegitimizes all of its products. Our
claim is that in the context of a legislature as dysfunctional as
New York’s, every bill enacted violates legislative due process.
There is a legitimate argument to be made that such violations
are justiciable,15 but whether and how the courts could or
should address this problem is another matter entirely. The
10. Id. at 239.
11. ERIC LANE & MICHAEL ORESKES, THE GENIUS OF AMERICA: HOW THE
CONSTITUTION SAVED THE COUNTRY AND WHY IT CAN AGAIN 77 (2007).
12. Id. at 53.
13. Meyers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
14. See generally LANE & ORESKES, supra note 11.
15. In Linde’s estimation, ―to deny an injured party relief from an
improperly made law means either that courts will tolerate violations of due
process of law, or else that every breach of the prescribed process does not fall
short of due process in the constitutional sense.‖ Linde, supra note 9, at 245.
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separation of powers concerns raised by judicial review of
legislative procedures warrant such prudence that we can
recommend only modest judicial remedies that leave the
fundamental workings of the Legislature in the hands of that
body. The best approach to solving this problem is undoubtedly
through the political and legislative processes. Ultimately, it is
up to the public to hold the Legislature accountable for
infringing on their right to democratic representation.
We begin by examining the lawmaking process in New
York and contrasting it with the characteristics of a legitimate
lawmaking process. In this context, we define and apply
Linde’s theory of due process of lawmaking to New York. We
then consider the conditions under which litigation might be
brought under this doctrine in New York, and conclude with a
discussion of the limitations of this approach and an
exploration of the political approach to restoring legitimacy to
the legislative process.
II. The Characteristics of a Legitimate Law Making Process
Legislative due process demands a legitimate law making
process. It is our first task, then, to define the characteristics
of governmental legitimacy.16
The three legitimizing
characteristics
of
democratic
government
are
1)
representativeness, 2) accessibility, and 3) deliberativeness.17
16. It is important to note that legitimacy is not synonymous with
rationality. While it is not unreasonable to expect legislators to base their
policy decisions on ―knowledge of present conditions; the identification of a
preferred future, or a goal; and a belief that the proposed action will
contribute to achieving the desired goal,‖ this model of rationality is not a
realistic standard for legislative legitimacy. Id. at 223-24. The courts have
repeatedly held that laws are constitutional so long as ―any set of facts which
can reasonably be conceived would sustain it.‖ Palladio, Inc. v. Diamond, 321
F. Supp. 630, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). In other words, although a legislature’s
failure to document the extent to which it has investigated a problem that a
bill attempts to address and develop the best possible solution to that
problem may be symptomatic of a greater lack of deliberativeness, the
apparent lack of rationality in the lawmaking process alone is an insufficient
basis for invalidating a law. While Linde notes that in large part, many state
legislatures and Congress live up to a higher standard of rationality, it is not
within the court’s purview to ask if a law achieves its stated goal, only
whether the goal is legitimate. Id. at 212.
17. See generally ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, THE LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS (3d ed. 2009).
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Representativeness is defined as access to the franchise, ballot
access for candidates, and the obligation of legislators to
represent constituent interests.18
Accessibility has two
defining characteristics: first, ―the right of the people to
petition their legislators for the redress of problems,‖ and
second, ―the right of the people to know what their legislators
are doing (and not doing) in the conduct of public business.‖19
Finally, deliberativeness describes processes that ―slow
legislative decisionmaking and distance it from the passions
and immediacy of the prevailing desires of individual
legislators and of various constituencies.‖20
These characteristics are rooted in the United States
Constitution and its derivative state constitutions, and have
been underscored as these documents have evolved to their
present state. As the Framers of the Constitution surveyed the
United States in 1787, eleven years after independence, one
thing became abundantly clear: America was imploding,
leaving a nation described later by John Quincy Adams as
―groaning under the intolerable burden of . . . accumulated
evils.‖21 As the historian Gordon Wood wrote, the Framers saw
in America, ―mistrust, the breakdown of authority, the increase
of debt, the depravity of manners, and the decline of virtue.‖22
The problem was that Americans had proven not to be as
virtuous as hoped for by Thomas Paine and other leaders of the
revolution.
Their conduct, like people everywhere, was
dominated by their own self-interest. As George Washington
wrote to John Jay, ―we have probably had too good an opinion
of human nature in forming our confederation. . . . We must
take human nature as we find it. Perfection falls not to the
share of mortals.‖23 Alexander Hamilton put it more bluntly,
―men love power. . . . Give all the power to the many, they will
oppress the few. Give all power to the few, they will oppress

18. Id.
19. Id. at 595.
20. Id. at 541.
21. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 17761787, at 393 (1998).
22. Id. at 476.
23. Letter from George Washington to John Jay (Aug. 15, 1786)
available
at
http://gwpapers.virginia.edu/documents/constitution/1784/jay2.html.
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the many.‖24
The problem for the Framers was to protect American
freedom from American vice.
The solution was first
representation, what Madison considered the ―pivot‖ of the new
Through representation the nation’s multiple
system.25
interests (originally as defined by the Framers and later
expanded by amendments to include, for example, women and
other racial and language minorities) could be heard.26 From
this perspective, the Framers defined freedom as the ability to
advocate for one’s interests to members of the legislature–
though not necessarily to have those interests realized.27
Through the separation of political power among two
legislative houses and among the separate branches of
government, the Framers intended to make certain that no
particular interest could dominate another and that Americans
would suffer neither executive nor legislative tyranny of the
majority. Of this latter form of tyranny, Madison wrote, ―there
is no maxim in my opinion which is more liable to be
misapplied and which therefore more needs elucidation than
the current one that interest of the majority is the political
standard of right and wrong.‖28 In short, a reliance on public
virtue was to be replaced by a ―policy of supplying by opposite
and rival interests, the defect of better motives.‖29 Success
would require compromise and consensus, reached through
slow deliberation. From these principles flowed a common
form of elective government, characterized by representatives
elected from districts of roughly equal population to a
bicameral legislature,30 the ability of any legislator to introduce
a bill, the requirement that all bills must be passed by both
houses of the legislature and signed by the governor before
becoming law, and a system of checks and balances that
24. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 131-35 (1987).
25. See LANE & ORESKES, supra note 11, at 56.
26. Id. at 123.
27. Id. at 124.
28. Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Oct. 5, 1786). See also
LANE & ORESKES, supra note 11, at 52.
29. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
30. This is true of the Federal Government and all state governments
except Nebraska, which has a unicameral legislature. See, e.g., NEB. CONST.
art. III, § 1.
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includes executive veto power and courts with the ability to
interpret the constitutionality of statutes. New York’s state
government has all of these structural characteristics, and on
paper, it looks like a model of democratic government. In
practice, the situation in New York is very different.
III. The New York State Legislature at Work
In Congress and in most state legislatures, legislators and
their staff study an issue before crafting and introducing
legislation that is then subjected to the rigors of a committee
process that includes public hearings, debate, and a public
reading for amendments called a ―mark-up.‖ In most American
legislatures, all bills reported to the floor are typically
accompanied by committee reports that provide background on
the issue addressed by the bill and show the committee’s work
on the legislation and, where appropriate, fiscal analysis
prepared by a qualified state employee. Once legislation
reaches the floor, it is allowed to age for a time period sufficient
to allow members to review the legislation, and then it is
subject to debate during which rank-and-file members
substantively discuss and, if appropriate, amend the
legislation. Once a bill passes both houses, most legislatures
subject it to a conference committee to reconcile differences in
each chamber’s version before sending it to the governor.31
In New York, almost none of these things occur. This is
largely attributable to New York’s history of a leadershipdominated legislative process, which undercuts normal
legislative procedures from the outset.32 A hollow committee
process ensures that legislation with which the leadership does
not agree will never gain momentum through early exploration;
instead, leadership shapes and solicits support for legislation in
closed-door party conferences.33
Legislators introduce an
extraordinary volume of bills, many of which are ill-considered,

31. This is not to say that there are not many exceptions to this general
format. Congress and other state legislatures do occasionally stray from
these typical procedures, but these instances remain the exception. In New
York, deviation from the standard of legislative legitimacy is the rule.
32. 2004 REPORT, supra note 3, at 14.
33. Id. at 25, 43.
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redundant, or both.34 Which bills comprise the fraction of
introduced legislation that receives a committee vote is left
largely up to chamber leadership.35 Committees, for their part,
rarely substantively deliberate on bills and never read them for
amendments, acting instead as a rubber stamp for those bills
that have the support of chamber leadership and a bottleneck
for those that do not.36 Closed-door majority-party conferences
run by the leadership of each chamber replace committee
deliberation; in these conferences, the fate of legislation is
sealed outside of the public eye.37 By the time a bill reaches
the floor of the full chamber for a vote, its passage is a foregone
conclusion, and as a result, rank-and-file members have little
interest in debating or even reading the legislation on which
they must vote. Members are further shut out of the process
through the abuse of messages of necessity, a constitutional
provision allowing the Governor to circumvent the regular
aging and debate of bills for emergency legislation. In practice,
this provision has historically been used to circumvent regular
review of non-emergency legislation that might not withstand
even the limited deliberation that occurs during the course of
New York’s regular legislative process.38 Bills that are not
guaranteed to pass almost never make it to the floor.
Dysfunction begins at the very first step of New York’s
lawmaking process. In 2008, the New York State Legislature
broke a record by introducing more than 18,000 bills.39 Just
1,634, or 9%, passed both chambers.40 By way of comparison,
members of the United States Congress introduced fewer than
11,000 bills and resolutions in the same year.41 In other state
legislatures, the next-highest bill introduction rate was in New
Jersey, with only one-third the number of bills introduced than
in New York.42 Citing the likelihood that legislators introduce
such a massive amount of legislation for the political benefits of
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 43, 51-52.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 48, 71 n.185.
Jenny Lee-Adrian, Most Bills Don’t Become a Law in NY,
POUGHKEEPSIE J., Sept. 26, 2008, at A1.
40. Id. See also 2008 REPORT, supra note 3, at 25.
41. 2008 REPORT, supra note 3, at 24.
42. Id.
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staking a claim on an issue rather than out of a sincere effort to
change the law, the Brennan Center’s 2004 report suggested
that disproportionate resources were being devoted to
legislation that was never meant to see the light of day.43 In
this context, however, this statistic is less interesting as an
example of New York’s rampant government inefficiency than
it is as an indicator of the fact that bill introduction is the only
point at which rank-and-file legislators are given the power to
substantively weigh in on many issues. As we will show
throughout this section, utterly hollow committees, reliance on
closed-door party conferences for the conduct of legislative
business, the inability of members to move bills to the floor
over the wishes of leadership, and floor votes that serve only to
codify predetermined legislative outcomes, all strip rank-andfile members of their ability to fully participate in lawmaking,
and ultimately, to represent their constituents.
Once bills are introduced and referred to committee,
matters do not improve. In Congress and in most state
legislatures, committees are the engine of deliberation, the
place where bills are considered, debated, and remade. In New
York, committees go largely unused.44 Committees rarely hold
hearings to gather information on the legislation under their
consideration; of the 152 pieces of major legislation enacted
into law between 1997 and 2001, only one bill was the subject
of a hearing devoted specifically to its consideration.45 While
matters have improved somewhat in recent years, hearings
continue to be broad and issue-based, and not focused on the
specifics of the legislation at hand.46 Neither chamber of the
New York State Legislature requires committees to read bills
for amendments, and legislators attest that reading bills aloud
before holding a committee vote—let alone discussing them in
detail—is not common practice.47 Only one ―mark-up‖ in which
committee members read through a bill line-by-line and
43. 2004 REPORT, supra note 3, at 38.
44. 2008 REPORT, supra note 3, at 24-25.
45. 2004 REPORT, supra note 3, at 7.
46. See, e.g., Posting of Laura Seago to ReformNY: The Brennan Center
Blog
on
New
York,
Progress
on
Committee
Hearings?,
http://reformny.blogspot.com/2009/04/progress-on-committee-hearings.html
(Apr. 27, 2009, 18:16 EST).
47. See 2004 REPORT, supra note 3, at 9-10; 2006 REPORT, supra note 3,
at 11-12; 2008 REPORT, supra note 3, at 5-6.
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suggested changes to its sponsor has occurred in recent
memory.48 The absence of background work on the issue
addressed by a bill provides little fodder for debate, and as a
result, dissent in committees is exceptionally rare; in 2006 and
2007, more than 80% of committee votes on major legislation
were unanimous.49 Committee reports, which are required by
the Senate rules to accompany all legislation reported to the
floor, reflect the anemic nature of the committee process,
showing little more than a voting record.50 The Assembly does
not require committees to report on matters referred to them at
all.51 Similarly, the Assembly rules set no requirements for
fiscal analyses to be attached to bills with budgetary impact,52
and although the Senate rules do require fiscal analyses, the
Senate Finance Committee, which is required by the chamber’s
rules to maintain a file of ―all bills requiring fiscal notes and
the notes appertaining thereto,‖ does not have fiscal notes on
file for many recent bills with clear fiscal impact.53
While bills reported to the floor by committees typically
receive no more consideration than an up-or-down vote, many
legitimate bills that do not have the blessing of chamber
leadership are not even subject to this cursory consideration.54
In the Assembly, the Ways and Means and Codes Committees
have the authority to request bills outside of their jurisdiction
and to then sit on them indefinitely, earning them the informal
designation as the place ―where bills go to die.‖55 Assembly
members only have the ability to force bills out of committee at
the end of the second year of a legislative cycle,56 and until
48. The only mark-up that has ever occurred to anyone’s knowledge was
arranged by freshman Senator Daniel Squadron in April of 2009 in response
to concerns that committees were not adequately deliberative. Daniel L.
Squadron, Senator Squadron Adopts Brennan Center Recommendations for
Robust
Committee
Meeting,
New
York
State
Senate,
http://www.nysenate.gov/print/20528 (last visited Mar. 29, 2010). Senator
Squadron’s markup procedure largely followed the Brennan Center’s
proposed model. Id.
49. 2008 REPORT, supra note 3, at 10.
50. Id. at 11.
51. Id. at 17.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 18.
54. Id. at 6.
55. Id. at 14.
56. 2008 N.Y. Assem. Rule IV § 5(b).
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recently, Senators did not have this power at all.57
Once bills are reported out of committee, they go to the
floor calendar. According to written procedure, bills are to age
for three days and then, once they reach the ―third reading
calendar,‖ they receive a vote.58 In practice, bills can face one
of two wildly divergent fates based on the wishes of chamber
leadership. If a bill has leadership support, the Speaker or the
Majority Leader can ask the Governor to issue a ―message of
necessity,‖ a constitutional procedure intended for emergency
measures that circumvents the normal three-day aging of bills
and truncates debate.59 Tenuous relations between the
Governor and the Legislature over the past several years have
reduced the frequency of the abuse of messages of necessity,
but in 2000, more than a third of the legislation passed that
was included in the Brennan Center’s sample, was sped
through at least one chamber using this method.60 Some of the
worst examples of rushed legislation occurred at the end of the
legislative session; in 2005, 2006, and 2007, both houses passed
more than 30% of all major legislation during the final three
days of session,61 and in 2009, the Assembly passed 202 bills, or
16% of all passed legislation, during the final thirteen hours of
session.62 With less than four minutes allotted to each bill, we
can speculate with reasonable certainty that no debate
occurred.
The leadership typically only sends bills to the floor if they
are guaranteed to pass; before the summer of 2009, not a single
bill was voted down on the floor of either chamber in over a
decade.63 During a dispute over a bill that was apparently on
57. This was changed first by the January 2009 rules that allowed for
motions to discharge and then by the July 2009 changes that established the
―motion for committee consideration‖ by which a sponsor may compel a
committee to place a bill on its agenda and a ―petition for consideration,‖
which, if signed by 3/5 of members elected to the chamber, allows a bill to
circumvent the committee process entirely. As of this writing, these rules
have yet to be put to use. 2009 N.Y Sen. R. VII § 3(e); id. XI § 3.
58. Id. VIII § 1.
59. Id.
60. 2004 REPORT, supra note 3, at 29.
61. 2008 REPORT, supra note 3, at 21.
62. Press Release, Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver, Legislative
Material in the Assembly on Monday, June 22 (June 22, 2009), available at
http://assembly.state.ny.us/Press/20090622h/.
63. 2008 REPORT, supra note 3, at 15. Since the summer 2009 coup in
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the active list without a calendar number, as required by
chamber rules, one frustrated Senator quipped, ―[i]t’s like
professional wrestling, we give the number ahead of time
because we know it’s going to pass?‖64 With the outcome of
legislation a foregone conclusion, many legislators do not even
bother to dissent. In 2006, over 96% of major legislation in
both chambers was passed with no substantive debate,65 and
over 86% of major legislation passed both houses with no floor
discussion at all.66 In 2007, only 11.7% of major bills received
any ―no‖ votes in the Senate, and only 31.7% of those bills
received any ―no‖ votes in the Assembly.67 In most cases, these
bills only received one or two dissenting votes.68 In 2007, for
example, less than 2% of major bills were opposed by at least
one tenth of the Senate membership.69
If a bill is opposed by chamber leadership or it does not
have adequate support to pass, it is unlikely that it will receive
a floor vote at all. Legislative leaders determine the ―active
list‖ of bills that receive floor consideration on the next
legislative day.70 In the Assembly, there is no provision
allowing rank-and-file legislators to move bills to the active list
over the wishes of the rules committee, which is chaired by the
Assembly Speaker. Until recently, the Senate imposed a
similar barrier on bills coming to the floor.71
the New York State Senate, six bills have failed before the full chamber. Email from Andrew Stengel, Senior Adviser for Government Reform, New York
State Senate Majority, to Laura Seago, Research Associate, Brennan Center
for Justice (Dec. 3, 2009, 11:59 EST) (on file with the Brennan Center).
64. N.Y. S. Debate on S.B. 5755, May 7, 2007, at 2514, lines 13-17.
65. For the purposes of Brennan Center studies, we define ―substantive
debate‖ as any floor debate that includes questioning or back-and-forth dialog
on the substance of the bill (as opposed to speeches describing an individual’s
intent to vote for or against the bill in general terms). See, e.g., 2006 REPORT,
supra note 3, at 46.
66. 2008 REPORT, supra note 3, at 19.
67. Id. at 15.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. N.Y. Sen. R. VIII § 6.
71. Rules reforms passed in July of 2009 allow members to move or
petition for a bill to be placed on the third reading calendar, after which it
must receive a vote. As of this writing, these rules have not yet taken effect
due to restrictions on the date after which such a motion is allowed. Press
Release, N.Y. State Senator David J. Valesky, Historic Senate Rules Reform,
Sponsored by Senator Valesky, Passes Senate (July 16, 2009), available at
http://www.nysenate.gov/press-release/historic-senate-rules-reform-
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To help them decide which bills should go to the floor and
which should be permanently detained, chamber leadership
replaces the normal machinations of the legislative process
with secret party conferences where the chamber’s leader polls
individual legislators and negotiates compromises, all outside
of the public eye.72 In effect, and sometimes in actual practice,
this process subverts the deliberative value of the committee
process. In 2008, for example, the Assembly majority deemed a
proposal to establish congestion pricing ―so important that the
[Democratic] conference substituted for a committee
meeting.‖73 Following the closed-door conference, Speaker
Sheldon Silver unilaterally decided to keep the legislation from
coming to the floor for a vote.74 Majority party members
argued that all members had the opportunity to voice their
opinions by expressing them to the speaker individually or at
the party conference,75 but any such activity occurred outside
the formal legislative process and away from the public eye.
Even when a majority of the chamber as a whole supports
legislation on a particular issue, a vote may not occur because
either the majority party conference or the leader decides to
hold a bill back for political reasons.76
After an appellate court challenged the right of legislatures
to conduct public business in secret caucuses in 1981, the New
York State Legislature changed the state’s Open Meetings Law
to exempt political caucuses regardless of the subject matter of
the discussion, including discussion of public business.77
Although this runs counter to the legislation’s purpose clause,78
sponsored-senator-valesky-passes-senate.
72. 2004 REPORT, supra note 3, at 43; see also MIKVA & LANE, supra note
17, at 533.
73. Azi Paybarah, Congestion Drip: Is Sheldon Silver the Man to Blame,
N.Y.
OBSERVER,
Apr.
8,
2008,
available
at
http://www.observer.com/2008/congestion-drip-sheldon-silver-manblame?page=0%2C0.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. MIKVA & LANE, supra note 17, at 533-35.
78. The legislative declaration reads:
It is essential to the maintenance of a democratic society
that the public business be performed in an open and public
manner and that the citizens of this state be fully aware of
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this legislation enables lawmakers to shroud virtually all
public business in secrecy. While rank-and-file members of
both parties may, as some Assembly members asserted in 2008,
have the opportunity to privately express their views to
chamber leadership and may also rigorously debate bills
behind closed doors, members are stripped of the opportunity
to cast a public vote on even those matters whose consideration
dominates a legislative session.79 The public is then unable to
ascertain their elected representatives’ stances on these and
other issues of importance.
This obfuscation of legislative business extends beyond
party conferences. Unlike many other states, the New York
State Legislature does not, as of this writing, provide meeting
minutes, hearing and debate transcripts, committee voting
records, or fiscal analyses to the public in an easily accessible
online format.80 The limited resources that allow a member of
the public to determine where a legislator stands on a bill are
available through public records requests that often take weeks
or months to process.81 Other materials critical to public
understanding of where a bill stands, such as written
committee meeting minutes, earlier versions of amended bills,
or substantive reports setting forth a committee’s work on a
bill, do not exist at all.82 In addition to restricting the public’s
access to the legislative process, the absence of substantive
documents showing the work of the legislature—likely
resulting from the fact that little work worthy of documenting
actually occurs—poses a challenge to courts tasked with
and able to observe the performance of public officials and
attend and listen to the deliberations and decisions that go
into the making of public policy.
N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 100 (McKinney 2008).
79. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 17, at 533-35.
80. New Senate rules passed in July of 2009 indicate that this should
change in at least one chamber, but the Senate has not yet digitized these
records, and the Assembly has made no similar commitment. See 2009 N.Y.
Sen. R. XIV § (1)(a).
81. This claim is based on the Brennan Center’s extensive experience in
filing requests for legislative records under the State’s Freedom of
Information Law. See 2004 REPORT, supra note 3, at 77; 2006 REPORT, supra
note 3, at 45; 2008 REPORT, supra note 3, at 32.
82. See 2004 REPORT, supra note 3, at 9, 11; 2006 REPORT, supra note 3,
at 10; 2008 REPORT, supra note 3, at 11.
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assessing legislative intent, as we discuss later in this Article.
IV. New York and Governmental Legitimacy
The previous section showed that New York’s legislative
process is undoubtedly dysfunctional. The task of this section
is to show that it is also illegitimate. As stated above, the three
legitimizing
characteristics
of
government
are
representativeness, accessibility, and deliberativeness. New
York fails on all three counts.
A. Representativeness
There are two key aspects of representativeness. The first,
―representativeness of the electorate,‖ concerns universal
suffrage and is largely irrelevant to the present discussion.83
The second, ―representative democracy‖—the ability to elect
officials to fairly represent their constituents—can be further
divided into the qualifications for office, elections to legislative
office, and representative obligations of legislators.84 While
representativeness vis-à-vis elections to legislative office faces
serious threats from restrictive ballot access rules, a legislatorcontrolled redistricting process, and retrograde campaign
finance laws in New York, these issues are less germane to the
present discussion than the legislators’ representative
obligations. We focus, then, on the extent to which elected
legislators in New York are able to represent their constituents’
interests.
The diminution of the role of rank-and-file legislators
functions to undermine representativeness in several ways.
First, by conducting debates and votes in private and failing to
hold hearings or other forums where the public can weigh in on
legislation, the legislature denies the public an important
opportunity to determine where their elected representatives
stand on an issue, in order to effectively advocate for their
policy preferences. This, of course, cannot be fully separated
from the principle of accessibility, which we discuss below.
Second, in denying members the opportunity to cast formal
83. MIKVA & LANE, supra note 17, at 465.
84. Id.
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votes on matters before the legislature by replacing formal
processes with party conferences, legislators on both sides of
the aisle are stripped of the most basic representative duty of
casting votes on behalf of their constituents.
B. Accessibility
Accessibility includes ―the right of the people to petition
the legislators for the redress of problems‖ and ―the right of the
people to know what their legislators are doing (and not doing)
in the conduct of public business.‖85 New York violates both
rights.
As discussed above, the shroud of secrecy over
legislative proceedings makes it nearly impossible for citizens
to effectively petition their legislators for the redress of
problems. While New Yorkers have the right to petition their
legislature, the efficacy of this process is undermined by the
fact that average citizens have no way of knowing what
legislative business their legislators are considering in closeddoor meetings and, on some occasions, may never have the
benefit of a recorded vote or statement reflecting their
legislators’ stances on some issues.
Those documents that are available to the public are often
not accessible until it is too late for their use as effective
advocacy tools, and their lack of substance obscures the public’s
view of the legislative process. Even if committee reports are,
in their paltry details, an accurate reflection of ―what their
legislators are doing‖ in New York’s hollow committees, the fact
that these committees have been replaced by secret meetings
subject to neither the State’s Open Meetings Law nor its
Freedom of Information Law means that the substance of what
legislators are doing—or not doing—in the passage of laws
remains hidden from view. There are no meeting minutes or
transcripts of any part of the legislative process other than
floor debates, at which point, as discussed above, legislative
outcomes are preordained.

85. Id. at 595.
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C. Deliberativeness
The characteristic of lawmaking in which the New York
State Legislature’s failure to conform to legislative due process
is most clear is almost certainly deliberativeness, or ―those
steps of the legislative process that slow legislative decisionmaking and distance it from the passions and immediacy of the
prevailing desires of individual legislators and of various
constituencies.‖86 In other words, deliberativeness is legislative
shorthand for the due diligence that the legislature must
perform in order to pass laws that achieve their stated goals.
In Congress and most legislatures, deliberativeness is achieved
through committee hearings and debate, an amendment or
―mark-up‖ process, and substantive floor debate.
In New York, bills with the support of chamber leadership
glide through both chambers, slowed by nothing more than
rubber-stamp votes of approval by a committee and by the full
chamber. Committees rarely hold hearings and never ―markup‖ legislation, and floor debate, when it occurs at all, is
virtually always perfunctory.87 The use of the word ―slow‖ in
the definition of deliberativeness included above should be, by
itself, cause for concern in a state where bills are routinely
rushed through final passage in less than five minutes and
where, in some years, over a third of major legislation skips
normal aging and debate.88
V. Remedies
In Due Process of Lawmaking, Professor Linde avoids
suggesting a specific remedy, stating in general terms that a
remedy is required.89 Of course, he is correct. A claim without
a remedy nonsuits a case. Linde does suggest that any remedy
that a court pursues should use the legislature’s own operating
rules as the primary standard.90 Unfortunately, this would not
solve the problem at the heart of New York’s legislative

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 677.
See 2004 REPORT, supra note 3, at 45-47.
See, e.g., id. at 16.
Linde, supra note 9.
Id.
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dysfunction. In New York, the legislature typically does follow
the letter of its own operating rules. The problem is that both
chambers’ inadequately robust rules are permissive of the
legislature’s ongoing dysfunction and the inaction of its rankand-file members. With this in mind, we explore the prospects
and pitfalls of a judicial remedy to the problem of New York’s
legislative dysfunction.
Asking a court to remedy New York’s dysfunctional
legislative process or to strike down legislation enacted through
this constitutionally-flawed process also asks a court to open a
Pandora’s box of possible separation of power and judicial
competency evils.91 Courts addressing challenges to New
York’s lawmaking processes have—rightfully, in our view—
avoided such danger.
This general rule has been long
established in New York jurisprudence:
Within the Constitution the legislature is
supreme, and when a law confessedly within the
power of the legislature to make, comes down to
the people, authenticated by the presiding
officers of the respective houses, approved by the
governor and certified and declared by the
secretary of State to be the law of the State, no
citizen, I think, in a private controversy, can call
upon the courts to go behind the record thus
made up and impeach the validity of the law, by
showing that in its enactment some form or
proceeding had not been properly followed or
adopted by the legislature, the supreme law
maker.92
91. See generally Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review,
The Congressional Process, and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary
Review, 111 YALE L.J. 1707 (2002).
92. People v. Devlin, 33 N.Y. 269, 283-84 (1865) (Campbell, J.,
concurring). See also Packer Collegiate Inst. v. Univ. of N.Y., 76 N.Y.S.2d
499, 504 (App. Div. 1948) (stating ―[t]hat the legislature may have enacted
the statute in question without legislative hearing or recorded debates we
regard as of no consequence. The statute on its face bears the mark of a
legitimate purpose, viz.: to legislate for the health, safety and general welfare
of children‖); Palladio, Inc. v. Diamond, 321 F. Supp. 630, 632-33 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (where the Plaintiff argued that the legislature did not conduct
hearings on a law that prohibited the sale or importation of certain wild
animal products; however, even assuming that Plaintiff’s contention was
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Convincing the courts to reverse course on this approach is
not, and should not be, an easy task. Perhaps the best news is
that neither New York nor federal courts have ever ruled, at
least directly, against addressing such a question. A recent
New York case, however, Urban Justice Center v. Pataki,
makes abundantly clear the judicial resistance any such
challenge will meet.93
Despite these high barriers and the dangers of such
litigation, at the end of this section we suggest a somewhat
circuitous path that a court attracted to the possibility of
remedying New York’s complete legislative dysfunction and
consequential constitutional harms might be able to follow,
prospectively if it chooses, without intruding too far into
legislative territory.
Two New York Court of Appeals cases, King v. Cuomo,94
and Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. Marino,95 provide guidance.
Both are cases in which the Court of Appeals narrowed the
meaning of the term ―internal‖ to allow it to opine against
legislative practices that it considered undemocratic.96 Skelos
v. Paterson97 also provides some hope. Here, after weeks of
very public and criticized legislative inaction, infighting, and
failure to renew critical legislation before the close of the fiscal
year, the New York State Court of Appeals determined, on
what could be fairly considered thin law, that the Governor’s
appointment of a Lieutenant Governor was constitutionally
correct, the Court held that ―there is no constitutional requirement that the
legislature conduct hearings and build a record when it passes a law‖);
Heimbach v. State, 452 N.E.2d 1264 (N.Y. 1983) (where plaintiffs commenced
an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the roll call vote taken for a
proposition was not correctly registered by the Clerk of the Senate and
therefore not validly enacted, the court held that § 40 of the Legislative Law
provides the presiding officer’s certificate showing the date and requisite
votes for the passage of a bill is conclusive evidence that the bill was validly
enacted and the court found this to ―[preclude] judicial review of the propriety
of the subject roll call vote to effect legislative action,‖ and did not, out of
―respect for the basic polity of separation of powers and the proper exercise of
judicial restraint . . . intrude into the wholly internal affairs of the
legislature‖).
93. 828 N.Y.S.2d 12 (App. Div. 2006).
94. 613 N.E 2d 950 (N.Y. 1993).
95. 661 N.E.2d 1372 (N.Y. 1995).
96. See Cuomo, 613 N.E.2d 950; Marino, 661 N.E.2d 1372.
97. 915 N.E.2d 1141 (N.Y. 2009).
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legitimate.98 The message we gather from that decision is that
egregious facts matter. As the Supreme Court of the United
States noted only last year with respect to a matter that
seemed to have no easy remedy:
It is true that extreme cases often test the
bounds of established legal principles, and
sometimes no administrable standard may be
available to address the perceived wrong. But it
is also true that extreme cases are more likely to
cross constitutional limits, requiring this Court’s
intervention and formulation of objective
standards. This is especially true when due
process is violated.99
While all of these cases provide guidance for a potential judicial
remedy, any attempt at mapping such a strategy must begin
with an exploration of Urban Justice Center, an appellate case
demonstrating the many obstacles that will be encountered in
planning a successful challenge.
A. Urban Justice Center v. Pataki
In 2005, The Urban Justice Center, a nonprofit
organization, along with Democratic Senator Liz Krueger and
Republican Assemblyman Thomas J. Kirwin, each a member of
their chamber’s minority party, brought a broad declaratory
judgment action under the Equal Protection and Freedom of
Speech provisions of both the United States and New York
Constitutions,100 challenging the lawfulness of practices ―used
by the majority party in each chamber to deny minority party
members meaningful participation in the legislative process.‖101
Most significant among these practices, particularly for a
discussion of legislative due process, was the use of secret,
unrecorded majority party conferences in each house for
98. Id. at 1146.
99. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2265 (2009).
100. Urban Justice Center v. Pataki, 828 N.Y.S.2d 12, 14 (App. Div.
2006). The plaintiffs also argued that the challenged practices violated
certain New York statutes. Id.
101. Id.
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conducting legislative debate and decision making.102 As
discussed earlier, it is these inaccessible conferences and the
atrophied committee system that form the basic element of the
due process violation.
Urban Justice Center alleged that these practices ―operate
to exclude it and its clients from participating in the legislative
process and fulfilling its mission‖ of advocating for indigents.103
The legislator-plaintiffs argued that these anti-minority party
practices diminished their capacity, as members of the
minority in each house, to participate in the legislative
process.104
The legislator-plaintiffs also made several resource claims.
They claimed that the majority leaders of each house denied
minority party members equal access to various resources for
their own legislative efforts (e.g., staff and postage) and for
their districts (e.g., earmarked funds).105
The court did not reach the merits of these claims, deciding
either on the basis of standing or prudence that none were
judicially cognizable.106
The equal protection approach
provided cover for the court, allowing it to view the entire
matter as an attempt by minority party members to seek
judicial reinforcements for battles they could not win
politically. In its decision, the court wrote that ―the challenges
to the holding of majority political party conferences are
nothing less than an assault upon our party system of
government, in which all the parties, not only the majority, try
to coordinate political and legislative strategy, with greater or
lesser effectiveness.‖107 By focusing on differential treatment
between minority and majority party members, plaintiffs
denied the court the broader and more accurate vision
presented by the Brennan Center, that:

102. Id.
103. Id. at 15.
104. Id. at 14.
105. Id. at 18. Incidental to this case, but not to this Article, is the fact
that leadership domination of the process (and membership acquiescence to
this state of affairs) leads to discriminatory practices.
106. Id. at 15.
107. Id. at 20.
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most legislators [regardless of party] are
effectively shut out of the legislative process,
particularly at the most significant stage, when
the leadership determines which bills should be
passed and in what form. As a result, New
Yorkers’ voices are not fully heard, and bills
are not tested to ensure that they reflect the
public’s views. 108
B. Standing
Standing in New York, as elsewhere in the country,
requires a plaintiff to allege a ―personal injury fairly traceable
to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be
redressed by the requested relief.‖109 On this basis, the Urban
Justice Center’s allegations of diminished opportunities to
participate in the political process as a result of majority party
domination of each house, without an additional injury, was
doomed from the start. The court concluded that Urban Justice
Center’s stated injury was ―too speculative to constitute the
type of an injury-in-fact necessary to confer standing.‖110 The
court went on to explain that:
Urban Justice Center has failed to explain how
defendants’ conduct has prevented it from
advocating in the Legislature, with the
legislative leaders, or with the legislative
members of the majority party, or show that
the majority party in either chamber is less
favorably disposed toward its mission than the
minority party.111
Additionally, even if the Urban Justice Center had
provided adequate evidence of the indubitable truth that the
then-Republican majority in the Senate was ―less favorably

108. 2004 REPORT, supra note 3, at 42.
109. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). See also MFY Legal
Servs. v. Dudley, 67 N.Y.2d 706, 708 (1986).
110. Urban, 828 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
111. Id.

23

988

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:3

disposed‖ to Urban Justice Center’s mission than the
democratic majority in the Assembly, such a complaint still
most likely would not have satisfied standing requirements;
later in its decision the court suggested that procedural claims
such as those offered by Urban Justice Center are not
justiciable.112
The legislator-plaintiffs’ process claims are more
immediate and specific.
Minority party members are
unquestionably treated unequally, even in the context of New
York’s lawmaking processes that marginalize almost all rankand-file legislators. Here, however, the court focused on the
redressability of the claims, not on their solidity.113 Citing the
United States Supreme Court decision in Raines v. Byrd,114 the
court determined that the legislator-plaintiffs’ process claims
were ―a type of institutional injury (the diminution of
legislative powers), which does not provide standing.‖115 The
reference to Raines is important. As we discuss below, it
basically precludes a judicial challenge to the offending
legislative processes by an individual legislator unless there is
an actual concrete harm to a legislator’s power, such as that
found in Silver v Pataki.116 In that case, the court determined
that a member of the Assembly did have standing to challenge
a gubernatorial line-item veto of non-appropriation bills which
the member had supported, writing that, ―[a]s a Member of the
Assembly who voted with the majority in favor of the budget
legislation, plaintiff undoubtedly has suffered an injury in fact
with respect to the alleged unconstitutional nullification of his
vote sufficient to confer standing.‖117
In Raines, a number of members of Congress who had
voted against the 1997 Line-Item Veto Act118 brought suit
challenging the statute’s constitutionality.119 Their alleged
injuries were various increases in executive power, which they

112. See id. at 18-24.
113. Id. at 15-17.
114. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
115. Urban, 828 N.Y.S.2d at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. 96 N.Y.2d 532 (2001).
117. Id. at 533.
118. Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (codified at
2 U.S.C.A. § 691 (West Supp. 1994)).
119. 521 U.S. at 814.
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argued unconstitutionally altered the balance of power between
the legislative and executive branches of government.120 The
Court determined that these claims were too abstract, but the
focus of the decision was on a conjoined standing point, the
justiciability of the substantive constitutional claim:
We have also stressed that the alleged injury
must be legally and judicially cognizable. This
requires, among other things, that the plaintiff
have suffered ―an invasion of a legally protected
interest which is . . . concrete and
particularized,‖ and that the dispute is
―traditionally thought to be capable of resolution
through the judicial process.‖121
It is this same doctrinal reasoning that informs Silver v.
Pataki, in which the New York Court of Appeals wrote, ―[a]
plaintiff has standing to maintain an action upon alleging an
injury in fact that falls within his or her zone of interest.‖122
C. Political Issue Doctrine and Separation of Powers
After the court determined that the legislator-plaintiffs did
not have standing to challenge the process claims, it was left to
consider the resource claims. The court judged (somewhat
questionably in our view) that the legislator-plaintiffs did have
standing to pursue those claims. But this pursuit was shortlived, given that the court immediately dismissed these claims
as not judicially cognizable under New York’s separation of
powers doctrine:
The first three causes of action, contesting the
unequal provision of office space, equipment,
staff, and printing and mailing expenses,
essentially challenge the Legislature’s allocation
of institutional resources to its own members, a
classic example of internal administrative
120. Id. at 816.
121. Id. at 819 (internal citation omitted).
122. Silver v. Pataki, 96 N.Y.2d 532, 539 (2001).
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prerogatives that are properly left to the
Legislature to make, in furtherance of the duties
particular to that body, without interference
from the other two branches of government.123
To make sure that other process challenges were
discouraged, the court folded the process claims, which it had
dismissed for lack of standing, into its separation of power
jurisprudence, suggesting that even if there were standing in
the form of a concrete injury to the legislator-plaintiffs, the
claims would not have been cognizable.124
As a general matter, it is hard to quarrel with this
reasoning.
There is something constitutionally and
democratically offensive about a court, unelected or elected,
entering the lawmaking process and directing the legislature to
follow certain procedures.
But despite this aversion to
constitutional intrusion, the New York courts have not always
stayed their hands. King v. Cuomo125 and Campaign for Fiscal
Equity v. Marino,126 two cases exploring the Presentment
Clause of Article IV, §7127 are prime examples of such forays
into the legislative process in which deference to legislative
determinations on the meaning of their own constitutionally
established procedures would have been entirely consistent
with state precedent and a reasonable interpretation of the
constitution. In fact, although the Court of Appeals deemed
the legislative practices in question unconstitutional in both
cases, the intermediary appellate courts determined that the
issues were not legally cognizable and left constitutionality to
legislative discretion.128
In King, a plaintiff argued that legislation recalled from
the Governor by a joint resolution of the Legislature and then
returned to the Legislature by the Governor should be deemed
enacted because the recall procedure was unconstitutional, and
thus the bill had aged beyond ten days so that it had become
123. Urban Justice Ctr. v. Pataki, 828 N.Y.S.2d 12, 28 (App. Div. 2006).
124. See id. at 17-20.
125. 81 N.Y.2d 247 (1993).
126. 87 N.Y.2d 235 (1995).
127. N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 7.
128. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. Marino, 625 N.Y.S.2d 331
(App. Div. 1995); King v. Cuomo, 584 N.Y.S.2d 207 (App. Div. 1992).
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law ―in like manner as if he had signed it.‖129 The court agreed
that the practice was unconstitutional for two reasons. First, it
was not enumerated in the Constitution, and second, it
undermined the ―integrity of the law making processes as well
as the underlying rationale for the demarcation of authority
and power in this process.‖130 Very relevant to any proposed
due process jurisprudence was the court’s second rationale: to
ensure ―that the central law-making function remains reliable,
consistent and exposed to civic scrutiny and involvement.‖131
Another important piece of this decision for future litigation is
the court’s willingness to apply it prospectively only:
―Prospective application of a new constitutional rule is not
uncommon where it would have a ―broad, unsettling effect.‖132
In Campaign for Fiscal Equity, the constitutional provision
is the same but the question is different. Here, the Majority
Leader of the Senate, the house in which the legislation in
question was first passed, refused to present it to the Governor
after it was passed by the Assembly.133 The question asked by
plaintiffs, beneficiaries of the legislation, was whether this
failure to present was consistent with the New York
Constitution’s Presentment Clause.134 The Court of Appeals
answered no, writing that ―[t]o hold otherwise would be to
sanction a practice where one house or one or two persons, as
leaders of the Legislature, could nullify the express vote and
the will of the People’s representatives.‖135 This is exactly the
condition that leads to our legislative due process claim.
Urban Justice, the many cases cited therein, King, and
Campaign for Fiscal Equity must frame any overall procedural
challenge to New York’s dysfunctional legislative process.
From Urban Justice, we know that it would be extremely
difficult for legislators to bring such a claim in their elected
capacity because of the legitimate standing and separation of
power questions that would ensue. We also know that a broad
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
(1995).
134.
135.

81 N.Y.2d at 250, 252.
Id. at 255.
Id.
Id. at 256.
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. Marino, 87 N.Y.2d 235, 237
Id.
Id. at 238-39.
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categorical challenge to New York’s legislative processes by any
plaintiff would likely fail for the same reasons. Most likely,
courts would determine that such claims are within the
legislative domain and outside of their reach. But from King
and Campaign for Fiscal Equity we learn that the Court of
Appeals, with the proper plaintiffs and claims, has been willing
to vindicate the broad rights of New Yorkers to a
representative, accessible, and deliberative democratic
government. How else can we read the court’s expressed
concerns about the ―civic scrutiny and involvement‖136 (King)
and ―express vote and the will of the People’s
representatives‖137 (Campaign for Fiscal Equity)? What is
needed to fruitfully channel the court’s constitutional idealism
is both a solid judicial platform from which the court can view
the extraordinary damage resulting from New York’s profound
legislative dysfunction and a reasonable remedy that
ameliorates the injury without overstepping the boundaries
implied by the separation of powers doctrine.
Given the limitations discussed above, two approaches
would seem to fit the bill. The first, more modest approach,
follows from the everyday problem experienced by the New
York Court of Appeals of how to read unclear statutes adopted
through a legislative process that never leaves a record of its
intent. Our proposal is that the court should adopt a canon of
construction that all statutes be interpreted narrowly unless
actual legislative history indicates to the contrary. The second,
more radical proposal emanates from the fact that all
legislative deliberation currently occurs in closed and
unrecorded majority-party political conferences. Here, our
proposal is that the court should declare unconstitutional the
provision of the Open Meetings law that allows for the
discussion of public business in the privacy of legislative
political conferences.

136. King v. Cuomo, 81 N.Y.2d 247, 247 (1993).
137. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. Marino, 625 N.Y.S.2d 331 (App.
Div. 1995).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/6

28

2010]

ALBANY’S DYSFUNCTION

993

D. Unclear Statutes to be Read Narrowly
Our first suggestion is for the court to read each statute
extremely narrowly unless its legislative history evidences an
intent that it be read broadly. Every case of statutory
interpretation involves the question of whether a statute
should read more broadly, covering more individuals, groups,
or actions; or more narrowly. The court should continuously
remind legislators and the public in its decisions that such an
outcome could be avoided if the legislature would establish a
legislative record documenting meaningful legislative
procedures. By defaulting to a narrow mode of interpretation,
the court signals to the Legislature that if it wants the court to
interpret ambiguities in its statutes, it must document its
intent—something the Legislature can only do through a
robust process.
Each year, statutory interpretation cases form the bulk of
the New York State Court of Appeals’ calendar.138 These cases
all ask the court to determine the applicability of a particular
statute to a particular set of facts that have either been agreed
to by the parties or resolved by the lower courts. Usually the
statute is unclear, meaning that the relevant text does not
provide a clear answer to the question at hand. Litigation over
the meaning of a clear statute is far less likely, given that it is
proscribed by the plain meaning rule, which for the most part
obligates the court to apply clear text as written.139 The court
has affirmed that ―[w]hen . . . a statute is clear and
unambiguous, courts are obligated to construe the statute so as
to give effect to the plain meaning of the words.‖140 As formerChief Judge Judith Kaye wrote, ―[u]nless a statute in some way
contravenes the state or federal constitution, we are obliged to
follow it—and of course we do.‖141
138. See generally New York Court of Appeals, Court of Appeals
Calendar,
http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/appeals/calpro/calendar.pl?calendar=default
(last visited Apr. 5, 2010).
139. See generally ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS (1997).
140. Cole v. Mandell Food Stores, Inc., 710 N.E.2d 244, 246 (N.Y. 1999).
141. Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century:
Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1, 26 (1995).
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When a statute is unclear, on the other hand, courts must
find meaning beyond its text. Legislative history is a critical
resource for courts tasked with determining legislative intent.
Despite a generation of academic debate over the probative
value of such history, it remains the touchstone of both federal
and state court interpretive efforts.142 The New York courts
have followed suit. As the New York Court of Appeals opined
regarding finding the meaning of an unclear statute, ―[o]ur
preeminent responsibility in that endeavor is to search for and
effectuate the Legislature’s purpose. In this respect, legislative
history and the events associated with and occasioning the
passage of the particular statute are valuable guiding
lights.‖143 Legislative history normally consists of the formally
documented steps of the legislative process. As Judge Patricia
Wald has written about Congress, ―legislative history is the
authoritative product of the institutional work of the Congress.
It records the manner in which Congress enacts its legislation,
and it represents the way Congress communicates with the
country at large.‖144 In Congress and most state legislatures,
the legislative entities that generate most of this
documentation are committees.145 Committees are the working
arms of most legislative bodies, and their products—committee
reports and transcripts of committee debates and hearings—
are the means by which legislatures inform most of their
membership and the public on the purpose, meaning, and
background of legislation.
Transcripts of floor debates
similarly can provide guidance.
Omitted from any serious discussion of probative
legislative history are executive signing statements. These
written statements, which usually accompany bills signed into
law, contain the reasons the executive is signing the bill and
often include the administration’s reading of particular
provisions of the bill. Such signing statements are normally
not considered probative of legislative meaning. They are postfacto statements of the executive that have not received
142. See generally MIKVA & LANE, supra note 139.
143. Fumarelli v. Marsam Dev., Inc., 703 N.E.2d 251 (N.Y. 1988).
144. Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative
History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States
Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 306-307 (1990).
145. See generally MIKVA & LANE, supra note 139.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss3/6

30

2010]

ALBANY’S DYSFUNCTION

995

legislative consideration.146 For this reason, the court logically
confines its exploration of legislative intent to documents
produced by the Legislature itself.
In New York, the typical documents that comprise
legislative history do not exist. As the Brennan Center has
reported, committees are moribund and debate on the floor is
almost nonexistent.147 As former-Chief Judge Kaye has noted
in her discussions of New York lawmaking, ―[i]n New York . . .
legislative history is relatively sparse.‖148 Often, the only
record of intent accompanying a bill is a bill jacket created by
the executive. After a bill is presented to the Governor, it is
common practice for ―the Counsel to the Governor to gather
comments on the bill from executive agencies and groups
affected by the legislation.‖149 With the bill, the comments are
placed in a file, known as the bill jacket:
In New York this bill jacket becomes the central
repository of a bill’s history. Sometimes a bill
jacket will contain a letter or memorandum from
a legislator or legislatively generated documents
such as introductory memoranda. Basically
though, almost all materials contained in bill
jackets are executively generated post passage
documents.150
The dearth of legislative history originating from the
legislature forces the New York courts to rely on these bill
jackets for interpretation. The Fumarelli decision is a typical
example: ―The Bill Jacket materials include two memoranda
presented for the Governor’s consideration, when he approved
the bill to become law, that are also useful to the interpretive
work of the courts.‖151 Of the two memos to which the court
146. MIKVA & LANE, supra note 139, at 40 (―While the [executive] has the
power to veto a bill and the legislature has the power to override the veto the
legislature has no power to veto or override the executive’s signing message
which can contain any statement the executive chooses to include.‖).
147. 2004 REPORT, supra note 3, at 19-20.
148. Kaye, supra note 141, at 30.
149. Eric Lane, How to Read a Statute in New York: A Response to Judge
Kaye and Some More, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 85, 113 (1999).
150. Id. at 113-14.
151. Fumarelli v. Marsam Dev. Inc., 703 N.E.2d 251, 254 (N.Y. 1988).
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refers, one was submitted by the Office of the Attorney General
and the other by the Office of the Secretary of State.152 After
examining two years of Court of Appeals decisions, one study of
New York statutory interpretation concluded, ―few made
reference (and none exclusively) to what is apparently prepassage legislatively generated legislative history.‖153
This reliance on executive-legislative history is problematic
and another example of how legislative dysfunction in New
York negatively affects the public. It shifts the power to define
legislative meaning or purpose from the legislature to the
executive branch of government.
But from the judicial
perspective this is a necessary measure to protect the integrity
of the judiciary. The lack of probative legislative history forces
two choices upon the New York courts. The court can either
become a political body, debating and deciding what the law
ought to be in each dispute, or create a façade of following the
law by deferring to an outside source that has the trappings of
legislative legitimacy.
The Court of Appeals has
understandably chosen the second course. As former-Chief
Judge Kaye has observed: ―Indeed, on our court we especially
strive for consensus in statutory interpretation cases as a
matter of policy.‖154
Our proposed approach—narrowly interpreting statutes
unless legislative intent dictates otherwise—would allow the
court to signal its preference for legislative history generated
by the Legislature itself and may, over time, force the
Legislature to begin producing documentary legislative history.
The intended outcome of this approach is to pressure the
legislature to better document its decision-making through
public processes, particularly at the committee level. As a
robust legislative process, particularly at the committee level,
is necessary to produce substantive and guiding legislative
history documents, this approach could lead to the reform of
the legislative process itself. While it is true that many unclear
statutes are the result of unforeseen or unforeseeable
circumstances, or compromises to leave certain phrases
unclear, a rich committee record can, and often does, provide

152. Id.
153. Lane, supra note 149, at 116.
154. Kaye, supra note 141, at 23.
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clues to the enacting legislature’s intent or purpose.155 The
court can then use such clues to determine the meaning of the
statutory provision in the context of the particular case in
question. We predict that the adoption of a doctrine of narrow
interpretation will motivate all participants in the legislative
process—both inside and outside the Legislature—to make
greater efforts to avoid a cookie-cutter approach to lawmaking
in the interest of establishing a record of legislative intent,
thereby forcing greater public consideration of legislation. In
other words, once the court’s doctrine of narrow interpretation
becomes clear, it will be in the best interest of lobbyists and
others advocating for the passage of a bill to ensure that their
intent is documented in the legislative record and is available
to a court that might be called upon to interpret a statute.
E. Opening Closed Political Conferences
As the Brennan Center reports evidence, the fundamental
problem with New York’s legislative process is the domination
by majority leadership.156 Such domination requires both
committees and chamber consideration to be moribund, but
leaders need some forum for communicating with members.
This is the purpose of the closed, unrecorded, political
conferences, most importantly those held by the majority party,
which are typically led by the chamber leader. It is in these
conferences—and only in these conferences—that bills are
presented, discussed in earnest, and voted on. Without a
majority vote of the majority party, no bill goes to the floor for
final consideration. Conversely, virtually every bill that goes to
the floor is passed.157 The conferences’ privacy is to cover the
fact that the discussions concern the politics of bills and not
their substance. What else would explain the reasoning behind
blocking public access to public business?158
155. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 139, at 27-29.
156. See generally 2004 REPORT, supra note 3; 2006 REPORT, supra note
3; 2008 REPORT, supra note 3.
157. Since the June 2009 coup weakened Democrats’ control of the
chamber, six bills have failed in the Senate. E-mail from Andrew Stengel,
Senior Adviser for Government Reform, New York State Senate Majority, to
Laura Seago, Research Associate, Brennan Center for Justice (Dec. 3, 2009,
11:59 EST) (on file with the Brennan Center).
158. For a general discussion of secrecy in government, see Eric Lane,
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As noted above, this closed process is protected by statute.
In 1985, after an appellate court determined that certain
political caucuses in which the legislative business of a locality
was conducted violated the state’s open meeting law,159 the
New York Legislature enacted an amendment to the law to
protect the privacy of its political conferences without regard to
―the subject matter under discussion, including discussions of
public business.‖160 About this provision, the New York
Commission on Government Integrity wrote, ―[i]n our
judgment, the public is entitled to make an informed decision
about the quality of its representatives, and cannot do so if the
significant deliberations of those representatives are held
behind closed doors.‖161
The use of party conferences as the exclusive venue for
meaningful legislative discussion and voting removes any
excuse for their appropriateness. A plaintiff injured by a
statute adopted in this fashion could challenge the due process
constitutionality of the statute, tapping into the democratic
rationales for both King and Campaign for Fiscal Equity.
Additionally, both the plaintiff and the court could address the
matter without treading into exclusively legislative territory.
Such a ruling might force the legislature into a more open
deliberative process.
Neither of these approaches is intended as a substitute for
a political remedy. Even if the courts are willing to pursue
either proposed judicial remedy—a far less likely prospect for
the second approach than the first—there is no guarantee that
either would serve as an adequate incentive for reform to a
Legislature as entrenched in a pattern of inaction as New
York’s. The Legislature may choose to ignore a court applying
our first remedy, and could reveal little meaningful
deliberation even if it did open party conferences in response to
a mandate from a court applying the second. Ultimately, the
Frederick A.O. Schwarz & Emily Berman, Too Big a Canon in the President’s
Arsenal: Another Look at United States v. Nixon, GEO. MASON L. REV.
(forthcoming).
159. Sciolino v. Ryan, 440 N.Y.S.2d 795 (App. Div. 1981).
160. N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 108 (McKinney 2008).
161. GOVERNMENT ETHICS REFORM FOR THE 1990S: THE COLLECTIVE
REPORTS OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY 328
(Bruce A. Green ed., 1991). For a full discussion of the case, changes, and
criticisms, see MIKVA & LANE, supra note 17.
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only force to which the Legislature can be guaranteed to
respond is political.
VI. The Political Process
Given the liabilities of a judicial remedy, a political remedy
is no doubt the most prudent in moving the Legislature toward
procedural functionality. The Brennan Center’s experience has
also demonstrated that over time, such an approach can be
fruitful.
The Brennan Center’s 2004 report provided editorial
boards, good government advocates, and reform-minded
legislators with a clear and simple thesis: New York’s
Legislature is the most dysfunctional in the nation, and it must
reform itself.162 In 2005, the Brennan Center laid out twentytwo concrete recommendations for procedural reform, and the
groundswell of support for these reforms compelled both
chambers to make modest changes to their rules—to great
fanfare.163 The Center’s 2006 and 2008 reports confirmed the
suspicion that these minor changes did little to solve the real
problems plaguing New York’s legislative process, and they
each renewed the call to adopt its full slate of recommended
procedural reforms.164
The low murmur begun by the Brennan Center’s efforts
was amplified as the Senate Democrats seized upon reform as
an issue on which they could distinguish themselves from the
chamber’s Republican majority. The Democrats adopted the
rhetoric of this reform agenda in their successful effort to
reclaim the chamber majority in 2008.165 Once in office,
Democratic Majority Leader Malcolm Smith introduced modest
changes to the rules, primarily focused on reducing restrictions
on discharging bills out of committee, and formed the

162. See generally 2004 REPORT, supra note 3.
163. See Press Release, Office of Senate Majority Leader Joseph L.
Bruno, Senate Passes Rules Changes and Reforms (Jan. 24, 2005) (on file with
author); Press Release, New York State Assembly, Silver and Nesbitt Announce
Bipartisan Agreement Reforming Assembly Rules (Jan. 6, 2005), available at
http://assembly.state.ny.us/Press/20050106/.
164. 2006 REPORT, supra note 3; 2008 REPORT, supra note 3.
165. See Nicholas Confessore & Danny Hakim, Capturing Senate,
Democrats are Poised to Control Albany, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2008, at P15.
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Temporary Committee on Rules and Administration Reform to
review that chamber’s operations and make more sweeping
proposals for reform.166 The chamber’s initial report in April
2009 included some preliminary suggestions primarily focused
on transparency and the promise that the committee would
develop clear guidelines for committee reforms by the year’s
end.167 In their June 2009 coup attempt, Senate Republicans
attempted to pass new rules that included many of these
suggestions alongside additional reforms.168
An important victory came in July 2009 when, after weeks
of infighting over control of the chamber during which each
party struggled to position itself as the voice of government
integrity and reform, the full Senate passed a rules resolution
in a post-coup overnight session.169 This resolution adopted a
significant number of the Brennan Center’s recommendations,
some of which were originally codified in the Republicans’ June
rules proposals.170 These reforms appear to end leadership
control over moving bills to the floor, allow committee members
to petition for committee hearings, and pledge that all
legislative materials will be made publicly available on the
internet.171 The resolution passed with the new rules also
promised that the Temporary Committee on Rules and
Administration Reform would revisit the issue of committees
later in the year to make further reforms.172 As of this writing,
this last promise has not been fulfilled.
The fact that these reforms only came about as the result
of a particularly brutal and drawn-out political battle that
166. See Malcolm A. Smith’s Biography – New York State Senate,
http://www.nysenate.gov/senator/malcolm-smith/bio (last visited Feb. 24,
2010).
167. See generally DAVID J. VALESKY & JOHN J. BONACIC, N.Y. STATE
SENATE, DRAFT REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY COMMITTEE ON RULES AND
ADMINISTRATION
REFORM
(2009),
available
at
http://www.nysenate.gov/files/pdfs/RulesReformx1a_0.pdf.
168. Danny Hakim & Jeremy W. Peters, Albany G.O.P. Wrests Control of
the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2009, at A1.
169. Posting of Andrew Stengel to New York State Senate Blog, Senate
Passes Historic Rules Resolution Sponsored by Smith/Valesky,
http://www.nysenate.gov/blogs/2009/jul/16/senate-passes-historic-rulesresolution-sponsored-smithvalesky (July 16, 2009).
170. S. Res. 2844, 2009 Leg. (N.Y. 2009).
171. See id.
172. Id.
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never had reform as its primary goal may actually hold
promise for future prospects for reform efforts driven by the
Legislature itself. The July 2009 coup was the result of the
Legislature’s own dysfunction, specifically the opacity of the
budget process and the dissatisfaction of the new minority
party with the limited privileges granted to its members in the
leadership-dominated chamber.
Continued legislative
dysfunction will no doubt breed similar dissatisfaction which
will, in all likelihood, lead to similar skirmishes in the future.
It is possible that these moments of chaos offer the most hope
for reform advocates; anyone seeking to quell a rising tide of
anger amongst rank-and-file members or to establish the
majority party’s credibility would do well to adopt reforms that
make the legislative chamber and the lawmaking process more
open, accountable, and deliberative.
It is our hope that the Senate’s July reforms have put into
motion a larger movement in the direction of legislative
legitimacy in New York. The dust generated by the June 2009
coup continues to settle, and the chamber’s leadership must
ensure that last year’s reforms will be allowed to take effect.
Its new rules must be put to use by members and advocates;
while these rules reforms enable a robust lawmaking process,
they alone do not constitute it. The Senate must also be held
accountable for its promise to enact further reforms with
respect to the committee process. And the Assembly, now by
far the less procedurally robust chamber, must be pressured to
follow suit. The pressure necessary to make these reforms a
reality must come from within the Legislature, from advocates,
and from the public at large. Voter discontent—another form
of chaos that catalyzes change—may also serve to push the
legislature toward reform in the future.
VII. Conclusion
On all three metrics—representativeness, accessibility,
and deliberativeness—New York fails the legislative legitimacy
test.
New York’s Legislature, with its leader-dominated
structure that subverts the committee process and obscures
public business from view, remains the most dysfunctional in
the nation. It follows, then, that legislative due process, which
dictates ―that government is not to take life, liberty, or property
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under color of laws that were not made according to a
legitimate law-making process‖173 is also violated in New York.
Our aversion to a strong judicial remedy is not born out of
doubt that New York’s situation is adequately dire to justify a
dramatic intervention. We counsel judicial prudence out of a
desire to avoid inadvertently undermining one fundamental
principle of American government, the separation of powers, in
the process of upholding another, legislative legitimacy. The
first judicial remedy that we do endorse—narrowly
interpreting all statutes not accompanied by legislative
history—is also derived from respect for government
institutions and the separation of powers. In the absence of
legislative history generated from the Legislature itself, the
court is forced to tread into the murky territory of overdeference to the executive when interpreting unclear statutes.
Narrow interpretations prevent the court from overstepping its
bounds and underscore the necessity of legislative history,
bolstering the integrity of the court. Our second proposed
remedy—a due process claim brought by an individual injured
by a statute deliberated only in a closed-door party
conference—also has, at its core, the intent of preserving the
integrity of state government, and does so without threatening
encroachment by the court on the wholly internal affairs of the
Legislature.
While the judicial remedies we propose have value in their
own right, New York’s especially obstinate Legislature may
need more than the gentle nudge offered by these solutions to
move toward reform. The political process is no doubt a
stronger tool in any effort to imbue New York’s lawmaking
process with legitimacy because it relies on the relationships,
procedures, and incentives that are native to the Legislature
itself. We have already seen some progress on this front.
The month long halt of Senate activity in June 2009 and
the Legislature’s failure to pass a deficit reduction plan
sufficient to close the state’s budget gap a few months later
highlighted the fact that New York state government is in
crisis. While the legislature has a host of substantive problems
to address, they can only be adequately treated through a
legitimate process. The court would be more than justified in
173. Linde, supra note 9, at 239.
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taking prudent and limited action to attempt to pressure the
Legislature to remedy itself. Action from the public and the
Legislature itself is more than justified—it is long overdue.
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